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CURATIVE STATUTES OF COLORADO RESPECTING
TITLES TO REAL ESTATE

N

By PERCY S. MORRIS, of the Denver Bar
o lawyer likes to "turn down" a title as unmerchantable. Occasionally a disappointed owner and wouldbe seller or a real estate broker may feel that a lawyer
takes a fiendish glee in rejecting a title as unmerchantable,
but this feeling is entirely unwarranted.
The title to real estate, which a lawyer is called upon to
examine and pass upon, is the title that is shown by written
instruments of record. Necessarily, therefore, the examination
of and passing on the title is a technical matter of examining
these papers which have been filed of record and determining
whether they show a title that appears good or whether there
are defects in the title so shown.
The attorney making the examination does so on behalf
of a client who desires to purchase the property or to make
a loan. If he passes the title as good, his labors after completing the examination are comparatively simple, consisting
of writing a brief opinion stating the title is good, subject of
course to such encumbrances, restrictions, tax liens, etc., as
may exist, preparing the necessary papers and closing up the
deal, and in such case his client is relieved and satisfied, the
owner of the property is likewise and everyone is happy. But,
if the lawyer turns down the title as unmerchantable, his troubles have just commenced; he must write an opinion setting
forth the facts concerning the defect and the reasons why same
renders the title unmerchantable and then he must explain the
matter to his client and tell him why it is that he is compelled
to reject the title and then follows a session with the owner,
going into again with him the matter, and possibly a similar
one with the real estate agent, and then usually comes arguing
out the matter with some other lawyer who has previously
passed the title, all of which involves a large amount of time
and discussion and conditions which can not be considered
enjoyable to the attorney, with no additional compensation
to him for the same.
But a lawyer of course can not pass the title because
rejecting it would impose upon him additional time, work
and unpleasantness. If he finds in the title a defect which
under the law or under the recognized practice would render

35

DICTA

the title unmerchantable, he must reject it; if he does not do
so, he is not true to his client and he subjects himself to the
danger of having his client come back to him in the future
because of such title being rejected by an attorney examining
for a prospective purchaser or lender.
There are of course various kinds and degrees of defects
in titles. It requires an expert knowledge and a nice sense
of discrimination to distinguish between defects which may
be considered as immaterial and of no consequence, on the one
hand, and defects which are substantial, on the other hand.
And a defect which is purely a technical one and which does
not mean that the purported owner of same does not as a
matter of fact own the property nevertheless may render the
title unmerchantable on the face of the records.
The foregoing are platitudes but they are merely an
introduction to statements as to the reasons which have
prompted the passage of the various statutes which, especially
during the last seventeen years, have from time to time been
passed by the Colorado Legislature to remedy various defects in record titles and to make titles to real estate more
merchantable. From time to time during such period groups
of lawyers, a substantial portion of whose practice consists of
examination of titles, have conferred together, discussed curative statutes which might be passed, agreed upon their phraseology and assisted in having them put through the Legislature. They did this in the interests of the public and, in a
sense, against their own selfish interests in that the passage of
a number of these statutes has meant that lawyers would not
be employed to bring suits to quiet title which they would
have been employed to bring had the statutes not been passed.
In selecting defects to be remedied by curative statutes
and in preparing the statutes there was required a fine sense
of balance between matters, on the one hand, which involved
actual substantive rights of which the owners thereof might
be deprived by the legislation, and, on the other hand, purely
technical matters which involved no substantive rights of
which the owners would be deprived by the legislation. It
is one thing to prepare hastily a statute to remedy a certain
kind of defect in the title, but it is another thing altogether
to guard against actual interests or property rights being cut
out thereby. Therefore the number of defects in titles which
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can be eliminated by legislation without unjustly cutting out
actual property rights is not unlimited.
The legislation which was thus conceived by lawyers or
groups of lawyers to remedy technical defects in titles in this
manner falls into two classes: one class consists of those statutes which make certain things appearing of record prima facie
evidence of certain matters; and the other class consists of
those statutes which impose periods of limitation upon the
assertion of rights and claims. It is believed that statutes
falling within either of these two classes are valid and constitutional. Patton on Titles 224-233.
It is not the assumption of the writer in preparing this
article that the lawyers do not know of these curative statutes and that they do not follow them. On the contrary, the
writer knows that the attorneys who examine titles are familiar with them and follow them. The purpose of this article
is to collect in one place in an alphabetical arrangement these
various curative statutes which have from time to time over
a long period been passed and which appear in the statutes in
various places, in order to provide a source of ready reference
to which the lawyer can turn to find quickly the statute he
desires, together with an explanation as to the purpose for
which each was passed.
Abstracts. By 1927 Sess. L. 600 Sec. 34, C.S.A. Chap.
40, Sec. 140, it is provided that an abstract of title certified
by any reputable Colorado abstracter or abstract company
incorporated under the laws of Colorado may be used to
establish prima facie evidence that the chain of title is as shown
by the abstract except as to any of the instruments of conveyance or record thereof or certified copy thereof which may be
offered in evidence and that the Court may take judicial notice
of the repute of the abstracter and that the absence of tax sale
certificates from such abstract for any period of time covered
by the abstract shall be prima facie evidence of the payment of
taxes during such period by the party relying upon any chain
of title shown by such abstract. In Hockmuth vs. Norton,
90 Colo. 453 it was held that under this section the abstract
of title, when admitted in evidence without limitation, is
"prima facie evidence that the chain of title is as shown
thereby." The purpose of this section was to do away with
the previously required laborious task of proving in an action
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the title of a litigant by introducing in evidence, one by one,
the recorded copies of each and every instrument making up
the chain of title of such litigant from the very beginning of
such chain, necessitating the carrying from the office of the
Recorder to the court room a large number of heavy books
and the identification thereof and testimony with regard
thereto of the Recorder or his Deputy and also to make simple
the proving prima facie of the payment of taxes for a period
of seven years so as to bring the case within the provisions
of C.S.A. Chap 40, Secs. 143 and 144.
Acknowledgments. Prior to 1927 the form of acknowledgment set out in the Colorado statute (1921 Comp. Laws
Sec. 4899) was one quite different from the form used in most
of the other states of the Union, particularly in that the Colorado form contained the words "to be his act and deed for the
Repeatedly, examining attorneys
uses specified therein."
would find in the title acknowledgments which omitted either
the phrase "to be his act and deed" or the phrase "for the uses
specified therein" without the substitution of any equivalent
words and it was felt generally by examining attorneys that
each of these two separate phrases was a substantial portion of
the statutory form, so that, if either of them was omitted
without substitution of equivalent words, the acknowledgment was a nullity. The omission of one or the other of
these phrases very often occurred because a deed was prepared,
executed and acknowledged in another state upon a form
printed for use in that state and containing not the Colorado
form of acknowledgment but the form of acknowledgment
in use in that state. To remedy this situation there were prepared and adopted in 1927 several sections. One of these
(1927 Sess. L. 585 Sec. 1; Original 1935 C.S.A. Chap. 40,
Sec. 107; now amended by 1937 Sess. L. 477, Sec. 1; 1938
Supp. C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 107) provided a very short and
simple form of acknowledgment which, as to an individual,
merely reads: "The foregoing instrument was acknowledged
---------------- 19 before me this --------- day of
,----------------thereby omitting the troublesome
by
words "to be his act and deed for the uses specified therein".
Another section (1927 Sess. L. 587, Sec. 2; C.S.A. Chap. 40,
Sec. 108) provided that, in addition to the officers then empowered to take acknowledgments within or without the
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United States, instruments may be acknowledged before any
Notary Public having a notarial seal. This was to cover the
condition created by the previous statute (1921 C. L. Sec.
4891 sub. Third) not having permitted an acknowledgment
to be made before a notary public outside of the United States
or its possessions. Another section (1927 Sess. L. 588, Sec.
4; C.S.A. Chap. 40 Sec. 110) provided that all instruments
affecting title to real property in this state which shall have
been theretofore executed or should be thereafter executed purporting to have been acknowledged or proved out of this
state before a notary public or other officer empowered by the
laws of this state to take acknowledgments, if the form of
acknowledgment be in substantial compliance with the laws
of the state or territory where taken or in substantial compliance with the requirements of the present statutes of Colorado,
shall be deemed prima facie to have been properly acknowledged or proved before proper officers. This section made
good any acknowledgment previously made in a form used
in the state where it was made but not in accordance with the
previously prescribed Colorado form and also any acknowledgment which had been previously made if it was substantially in the form prescribed by the present statutes and was
taken by an official authorized by the present statutes to take
acknowledgments.
Acknowledgments of Instruments Remaining of Record
M6re than Twenty Years. A large number of defects in titles
arise through defects in the acknowledgments to instruments
in the chain of title. In order to correct these defects arising
from defective acknowledgments or total lack of acknowledgments, where the instruments in question have been of
record for a long time, there was passed in 1913 (1913 Sess.
L. 319; 1921 Comp. Laws, Sec. 4906) a statute which, as
amended in .1927, appears as 1935 C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 111
and as amended in 1937 appears as 1937 Sess. L. 481, 1938
Supp. C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 111. This statutes provided that
instruments affecting title to real property which have remained or shall have remained of record in the office of the
Recorder of the county where the real property affected is
situate for a period of twenty years, although unacknowledged or not acknowledged according to law, shall be received
and may be read in evidence and the same or the record thereof
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or a certified copy of the record thereof shall be received and
may be read in evidence without additional proof of the execution thereof in the same manner and with the same force
and effect as if they had been properly acknowledged and
proved according to law. The 1937 amendment, for the same
reasons as are mentioned herein under the heading "Recording
a Long Time After Execution of Instrument", inserted in
the statute the words "irrespective of the length of time that
may have elapsed between the date of any such instrument
and the date when same was so recorded". Because of this
statute it is unnecessary and useless for an examining attorney
to devote any time to checking the sufficiency in form of an
acknowledgment to an instrument if the instrument shall have
been of record for twenty years or more because, even if he
finds the acknowledgment defective, such defect is of no consquence in view of the language of the statute.
Building and Use Restrictions. Considerable trouble
has been encountered by examining attorneys through there
appearing in the chain of title (usually in a deed of conveyance) provisions which not only impose building restrictions
but provide for the forfeiture of the title in the event that
such building restrictions are violated. An attorney will
naturally hesitate about passing the title for the making of
a loan by a client if his client's lien can be cut out through the
title of the owner being forfeited because of the owner violating the restrictions. Because of this there was passed 1927
Sess. L. 606, Secs. 46 and 47, C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 153 and
154, which provide that building restrictions and all restrictions as to the use or occupancy of real property shall be
strictly construed and that restrictions which provide for the
forfeiture of title to or an interest in real property because of
the violation of the restrictions on other real property (the
parcels of real property being owned by different persons)
shall be construed as applying only to the property embraced
in the restriction and owned by the party on whose property
the violation of the restriction occurred and that no action
shall be commenced or maintained to recover possession of
real property or to enforce the terms of any restriction concerning real property or to compel the removal of any building or improvement because of the violation of any of the
terms of any restriction unless said action is commenced within
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one year from the date of the violation for which the action
is sought to be brought or maintained.
Construction of Curative Statutes. As is seen from a
glance through this article, a large number of the curative
statutes mentioned herein were adopted in 1927 and were in
Chapter 150 of the Session Laws of that year. Section 44
on page 605 thereof, being C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 151, states
that it is the purpose and intention of the 1927 Act to render
titles to real property and every interest therein more secure
and marketable and that it is declared to be the policy in this
state that said act and all other acts and laws concerning or
affecting title to real property and every interest therein and
all recorded instruments, decrees and orders of court of record,
including proceedings in the suits wherein such orders or decrees may have been entered shall be liberally construed and
with the end in view of rendering such titles absolute and free
from technical defects and so that subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancees may rely on the record title and so that the
record title of the party in possession shall be sustained and
not be defeated by technical or strict construction.
Contracts of Sale. See Options to Purchase.
Corporations. In 1927 there were passed two sections
relating respectively to execution in the name of a corporation
of a deed before the filing of its incorporation papers and the
execution in the name of a corporation of a deed after expiration of its existence where there was an attempted renewal or
extension of its existence. Such sections are 1927 Sess. L.
607, Secs. 49 and 50, C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 156 and 157.
The first of these sections provides that, if at the time of the
delivery of a deed describing the grantee as a corporation, no
incorporation papers have been filed and if thereafter proper
incorporation papers shall be filed, the title to the property
shall vest in the grantee as soon as the grantee is incorporated
and no other instrument of conveyance shall be required. The
second section provides that where the corporate existence of
any corporation shall expire and there shall be an attempted
renewal or extension of its corporate existence, either within
the time provided for by law or thereafter, a conveyance thereafter by such purported corporation shall vest in the grantee
the interest of the former corporation. As to cases where the
deeds had been executed before the time when these sections
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went into effect, it is provided in the first of such sections that
it shall be conclusively presumed that the title vested in the
incorporators in trust for the grantee and that said incorporators properly conveyed the real property to the grantee when
the grantee was incorporated unless within one year from the
time the section went into effect there shall be filed in the office
of the proper Recorder a written explanation or statement of
the transaction signed and acknowledged by the proper parties
and it is provided in the second of said sections that the title
or interest so conveyed shall be presumed to have been properly passed to the grantee unless an action be brought within
one year from the time the section became effective to establish
a different result.
Death, Certificatesof. It very often is necessary in order
to have a merchantable title that the death of a person be
prima facie shown on the records. This arises most frequently
in cases where a life estate is devised or conveyed. By C.S.A.
Chap. 78, Sec. 128, a certified copy of the record of the death
of one dying in Colorado made and kept in accordance with
sections 104 to 114 of said chapter is made prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. This, however, left the question of whether, if the death occurred outside of Colorado, a
certified copy of the Certificate of Death issued by the official
of the foreign state would be admissible in evidence in a Colorado court and certainly, if it was recorded in the office of the
Recorder, the copy thereof in the records of the Recorder
would not be admissible in evidence. Therefore in 1927
there was passed a statute (1927 Sess. L. 591, Sec. 11; C.S.A
Chap. 40, Sec. 117) providing that a certificate of death
issued by a public official (whose apparent official duties include the keeping of records of death) of any state, territory,
county, parish, district, city, town, village, province, nation
or other governmental agency or subdivision thereof or a copy
of any such certificate of death certified by such public official
or by the county clerk and recorder of any county in the State
of Colorado in whose office the same or a certified copy thereof
shall have been recorded shall, insofar as the death may affect
any interest in real property, be prima facie evidence of the
death so certified and of the time and place of such death and
shall be admissible in evidence in any court in Colorado, and
that such method of proving death shall not be exclusive.
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Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds. 1927 Sess. L.
603-604, Secs. 39 and 40, C.S.A. Chap 40, Secs. 146 and
147 contain provisions which are probably the most helpful
statutory provisions that have ever been passed in Colorado in
the removal of defects in titles which otherwise would require
the titles to be rejected as unmerchantable. Said Sec. 146 provides that no action shall be commenced or maintained against
a person in possession of real property to question or to attack
the validity of or to set aside upon any ground or for any
reason whatsoever any final decree or final order of any court
of record of this state or any instrument of conveyance, deed,
certificate of sale or release executed by any private trustee,
successor in trust, Public Trustee, sheriff, marshal, public
officer or officers or appointee of a court when such document
shall be the source of or in aid of or in explanation of the
title or chain of title or right of the party in possession or
any of his predecessors or grantors, insofar as the same may
affect the title or explain any matter connected with the title
in reference to said real property, if such document shall have
been recorded and have remained of record 'in the office of the
Recorder where said real property is situated for a period of
seven years. Said section further provides that any and all
defects, irregularities, want of service, defective service, lack
of jurisdiction or other grounds of invalidity, nullity or
causes or reasons whereby or wherefore any such document
might be set aside or rendered inoperative must be raised in
a suit commenced within said seven-year period and not
thereafter. Said section 147 provides that persons under legal
disability at the time the right of action first accrued and who
at the time of the expiration of the limitation applicable are
still under such disability shall have two years from the expiration of a limitation to commence action and no action
shall be maintained by such persons thereafter. Said Section
146 provides that its provisions shall not apply to any of the
following cases: forged documents; during the pendency of
an action commenced prior to the expiration of said sevenyear period to set aside, modify or annul or otherwise affect
such document if notice of such action has been filed as provided by law; when such document has been by proper order
or decree of competent court avoided, annulled or rendered
inoperative; and where the party who brings the action to
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question, attack or set aside the validity of such document
or his predecessor shall have been deprived of possession
within two years of the commencement of the action. The
result of these two sections is that where a certified copy of a
decree entered in a suit affecting the title to real estate, whether
it be a foreclosure action or a suit to quiet title or an action for
declaratory judgment or any other character of action affecting the title to real estate, shall have been of record in the
office of the Recorder of the county wherein the real estate
in question is situated for the period of nine years (the seven
years provided by section 146 plus the two years provided by
section 147) prior to the time of the examination of the title
and the person in whose favor such decree was entered or his
successors in interest shall be in possession of the property
at the time of the examination and for the period of two
years immediately prior thereto and no notice of pendency
of an action to attack or set aside such decree is shown by the
records and no order or decree affecting or setting aside such
decree is shown in the files of the suit or by the records in
the Recorder's office, then the decree as entered by the court
and the certified copy thereof as set out in the records of the
Recorder can be accepted by the examining attorney as being
valid and binding according to the terms and provisions on
their face as against those named therein as defendants and
those who have acquired interests from them subsequent to
the filing of the lis pendens or the certified copy of the decree,
irrespective of any defects and irregularities there may be in
the securing of service of summons in such action or in any
other proceedings in such action prior to the entry of the decree. And the same result follows as to releases of deeds of
trust by Public Trustees and by private trustees and also as
to Public Trustees' Deeds, Sheriffs' Deeds, Special Master's
Deeds, Executors' and Administrators' Deeds and other conveyances, certificates of sale and releases executed by officials
included in the language of the section. A concrete illustration of the effect of these sections can be cited in the case of
Public Trustee's Deeds. In the article prepared by the writer
and published in the November, 1936, issue of DICTA entitled "Foreclosure by Sale by Public Trustee of Deeds of
Trust in Colorado", which article was prepared with the idea
of furnishing a guide to an attorney in carrying through fore-
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closure proceedings by sale by the Public Trustee, there were
set out the various steps and proceedings that should be taken
in the foreclosure and the manner in which they should be
taken to comply with the statutes and the law; and in such
article particular attention was given to the matter of the
notice of the sale that was to be given and with respect to
such notice it was stated that the publication of the notice
of sale and the mailing of such notice are the very heart of the
foreclosure proceeding and that the publication and mailing
of the notice of sale in strict compliance with the provisions
of the statute are necessary to confer power on the Public
Trustee to sell the property. However, under said sections
146 and 147, it is immaterial whether notice of the sale was
given in conformity with the provisions of the statute or not
and whether other proceedings were properly taken in the
foreclosure if the Public Trustee's Deed shall have been on
record for more than nine years and no. notice of pendency
of action to set same aside is shown in the records of the
Recorder and no decree setting it aside is shown in the records
of the Recorder and the grantee in such Public Trustee's Deed
or his successor in interest shall be in possession of the property at the time of the examination and shall have been in
such possession for two years immediately prior thereto. It
must be borne in mind, however, that, if the decree, the release,
the certificate of purchase or the deed is defective on its face,
then said sections 146 and 147 can not cure the defects which
are shown on the face of the instrument, since these sections
operate only to prevent the setting aside of such instruments
after the same shall have remained of record for the specified
period and to make them good according to their terms.
Therefore particular attention must still be given to whether
the decree, deed or other instrument correctly states the names
of all the necessary parties and the description of the property
and all other matters which should be stated in such instrument in order for it to be valid and fully effective on its face.
Deeds. See also: Acknowledgments; Corporations; Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds; Descriptions-Numbers
and Letters in; Executors and Administrators-Conveyances
by; Official Sales; Recitals prima facie Evidence; Recording a
Long Time after Execution of Instrument; Seals; Signature
of those Acting in Representative Capacity; Trustees; Unre-
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corded Instruments-Against Whom Invalid; and WillsPowers of Sale Under.
Descriptions-Numbersand Letters in. There is authority for the holding that the words "Lots numbered 1 to 10",
without the addition of the word "inclusive", convey only
the lots to but not including 10 and therefore such a description conveys only lots numbered 1 to 9, inclusive, and does
not convey lot numbered 10. Many titles are rejected because of the omission of the word "inclusive". Feeling that
when a grantor executes a deed conveying "lots numbered 1
to 10" he intends to convey all ten lots, irrespective of what
the technical interpretation given to same might be, there was
passed in 1927 a section (1927 Sess. L. 593, Sec. 15; C.S.A.
Chap. 40, Sec. 121) providing that all instruments wherein
the parcels of property affected are not separately enumerated
or listed, but are described as being from one numbered, lettered or designated parcel to another, shall be construed as
including the first and last designated parcels, and also the
intervening parcels, unless a contrary intention be expressly
and clearly set forth in the instrument.
Estates-Foreclosureof Deeds of Trust Against. The
statute passed in 1905 (1905 Sess. L. 290) as amended by
1917 Sess. L. 391, C.S.A. Chap. 176, Sec. 208, provided
that no mortgage, deed of trust or other security constituting
a lien or encumbrance on any property owned by any person
at the date of his death or on the date of adjudication of
mental incompetency or which secures an indebtedness constituting a claim against the estate of any decedent or mental
incompetent shall be foreclosed except in accordance with and
under the conditions prescribed by such statute. One of such
conditions was that such a deed of trust could not be foreclosed by sale by the Public Trustee during the period of one
year after the death or adjudication unless the claim shall have
been first proven and allowed or (if the amount secured be
not a claim against the estate) until the validity of the encumbrance and the amount secured thereby shall have been
first duly proved in the estate proceedings and permission
given by the County Court for such foreclosure by sale.
Under this provision, even though the proceedings for the
foreclosure by sale by the Public Trustee of a deed of trust
appeared entirely valid and regular upon the face of the rec-
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ords in the office of the Recorder and in the office of the
Public Trustee, nevertheless the sale might have been in violation of the provisions of such statute because of the person
owning the property having died or been declared incompetent or the person primarily liable on the indebtedness
secured thereby having died or been adjudged incompetent
and the foreclosure sale having been made less than a
year after such death or adjudication of incompetency
and no permission to foreclose by sale having been secured from the County Court. To be assured that something like this might not have happened which would
impair the validity of the foreclosure it would be necessary for the examining attorney to ascertain whether the
owner or any person primarily liable on the indebtedness had
died or been adjudged incompetent within a year prior to the
foreclosure sale and, if so, whether permission to foreclose by
sale had been given by the County Court. Therefore there
were passed in 1931 four sections (1931 Sess. L. 793-794,
Secs. 1-4; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Secs. 65-68) providing: that all
deeds of trust theretofore or thereafter executed to a Public
Trustee may be foreclosed by such Public Trustee in the usual
manner without regard to the fact that the indebtedness secured may constitute a claim against the estate of a deceased
person and notwithstanding the death of one or more of the
owners of the real estate covered by it; that such foreclosure
should be good against the heirs at law, legatees, devisees and
creditors of any decedent and all persons claiming by, through
or under such decedent; that notice of the foreclosure proceedings should be given in the usual manner to the grantor in the
deed of trust at the address stated therein as though living
and to all persons having record interests; that no notice of
the foreclosure proceedings need be given to any heir at law,
legatee, devisee, creditor or any person claiming by, through
or under the decedent unless the claim or interest of such person appears of record; that no deficiency claim shall be made
or allowed against any estate where foreclosure is had under
the provisions of said four sections; that the interest and claim
of all persons in and to the real estate claiming by, through
or under any decedent, including minors and mental incompetents, shall be terminated and concluded by such foreclosure
unless they shall redeem within the time prescribed by law;
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and that at the expiration of one year after said four sections
became effective all trustees' deeds theretofore issued by any
Public Trustee shall be considered valid and conclusive notwithstanding the fact that no court order permitting foreclosure had been obtained from the estate of a deceased debtor or
from the estate of a deceased owner. It is to be noted that
these four sections relate only to estates of decedents and that
they leave the 19 17 Act still in effect as to the foreclosure of
encumbrances against property owned by one who has been
adjudged a mental incompetent or securing indebtedness constituting a claim against a mental incompetent. A bill has
been introduced in the present session of the Legislature to
amend said Sections 65 to 68 and also the 1917 Act to make
the situation the same with respect to mental incompetents as
it now is under Sections 65 to 68 as to decedents and, by
amending said Sec. 208 of Chap. 176, to make the filing of
a claim in the estate of a decedent or mental incompetent,
before the foreclosure sale is held, a prerequisite to the allowance of a claim for any deficiency against the estate.
Executors and Administrators-Conveyancesby. Under the provisions of original 1935 C.S.A. Chap. 176, Sec.
95, it was required that where an executor or administrator is authorized by the will to sell real estate he must,
before making the sale, secure from the Court an order authorizing the sale and give a bond in an amount at least equal to
and not more than double the appraised value of the real
estate ordered to be sold and it was provided by said section
that no such sale shall be valid unless such bond shall be first
given and approved by the Court. In 1937 such section was
amended by 1937 Sess. L. 1365-1366, Sec. 1, 1938 C.S.A.
Supp., Chap. 176, Sec. 95, so as to provide, in the place of
the provisions above mentioned regarding securing an order
authorizing the sale and the furnishing of bond, that, if a
sale of real estate is made by an executor or by an administrator with the will annexed pursuant to a power of sale contained in a will, he shall forthwith make written report to
the Court of the fact of such sale and shall include in such
report a description of the property and the consideration received therefor and it shall then be discretionary with the
Court whether to require the personal representative to execute and file a bond, with the provision, however, that the
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failure to make such report of sale or furnish bond shall not
invalidate any such sale. In order to cure defects in titles
arising from deeds having previously been executed by the
executor or the administrator under a power of sale without
the required bond having been given, Secs. 2 and 3 on pages
1366-1367, 1937 Sess. L. provide that all sales of real estate
theretofore made pursuant to power of sale contained in a
will and which would have been valid and effective to convey title except for the fact that such sale was not made pursuant to the terms of Sec. 95, Chap. 176, Original 1935
C.S.A. were confirmed and declared to be valid and effective
for all purposes and that no action shall be commenced or
maintained to question or set aside any sale of real estate
theretofore made pursuant to a power of sale contained in a
will upon the ground that such sale was not made in compliance with the terms of said Sec. 95 unless such action be commenced within six months from the time that said 1 93 7 sections became effective. See also Wills-Powers of Sale under.
Homesteads. Previous to 1927 the statutes relating to
the encumbering or conveying of property, upon the margin
of the record title to which an entry of homestead had been
made, (1921 Comp. Laws, Secs. 5924-5931) required a
rather complicated procedure including the husband and wife
joining in the execution of the same instrument and the wife
voluntarily, separate and apart from her husband, signing
and acknowledging it and the officer taking the acknowledgment fully apprising her of her rights and the effect of signing the instrument and the acknowledgment to such instrument expressly stating compliance with the foregoing. Occasionally it was found that such a conveyance was signed by
only one of the spouses and afterwards a conveyance was
signed by the other and more frequently it was found that
there was some technical insufficiency or omission in the certificate of acknowledgment so that such certificate of acknowledgment did not show an exact compliance with the terms of
the statute. Feeling that too much red tape and technicality
in the present day and age should not be thrown around the
conveyance or encumbrance of homesteaded property and that
all that should be required for such conveyance or encumbrance should be such signatures and acknowledgments as
would be required if the two spouses owned the property as

DICTA

tenants in common, there was passed in 1927 a statute (1927
Sess. L. 592, Sec. 12; C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 119) which provided that to convey or encumber a homestead both husband
and wife must execute a conveyance or encumbrance of their
respective interests therein and that the same may be one instrument signed by both of them or by their separate instruments and that no special form of acknowledgment other than
the form provided to be used in other conveyances shall be
necessary. Also previous to the passage of this Act difficulty
was sometimes encountered in one or the other of the following circumstances: a person who, though unmarried, was nevertheless the head of a family and entitled to a homestead,
owned the property and entered it as a homestead, in which
case, when a conveyance or encumbrance of the property was
to be made, there was no spouse to join in the execution of
the instrument and there was no way except by suit in which
it could be established of record, even prima facie, that the
owner of the property was unmarried and that therefore it
was not necessary that his or her spouse also execute the instrument; and one of two spouses owned the property and
either of the spouses entered it as a homestead and the spouse
who was not the record owner died or was divorced, in which
case it was either impossible or exceedingly difficult to obtain
the signature of the former spouse who was not the record
owner and, although under the law, because of the death or
divorce, the signature of such spouse was not necessary to the
validity of the conveyance or encumbrance, nevertheless it was
difficult to show of record the death or divorce. To cover
these situations the said section in the 1927 law pro-ided that,
if the homestead be claimed by a person who at the time of the
conveyance or encumbrance thereof be not married, a statement to that effect in such instrument shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Judgments. See Decrees, Judgments and Official Deeds.
Lien Notes. During recent years there has arisen a practice on the part of certain firms and companies of having the
property owner sign a short instrument constituting in effect
both a promissory note and a mortgage upon property.. In
most cases these instruments were executed to roofing companies and in them the property owner agreed to pay the
roofing company a certain amount in certain installments for
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a new roof or for roofing repairs and gave to the roofing company a lien upon the property for the payment of same.
These instruments were acknowledged in the same manner as
other instruments affecting ttile to real estate and were then
recorded. Usually before these instruments were recorded
they were discounted by the roofing company to a finance
company and-in such cases the recorded copy of the lien note
showed an endorsement on the back of the instrument from
the roofing company to the finance company. These endorsements were never acknowledged. Later, upon payment of the
indebtedness, the finance company would execute and acknowledge a quit claim deed purporting to operate as a release
of the lien note. However, since the lien note was, in law and
in fact, a mortgage upon real estate, an endorsement or assignment thereof was in effect an assignment of a mortgage on real
estate and such assignment could not be accepted as showing
of record the assignment of the mortgage unless it was acknowledged. So that, since the assignment was only by endorsement and was not acknowledged, the endorsement was
not prima facie evidence of the assignment and so the later
quit claim by the endorsee could not be accepted as releasing
the lien note. And very often, when attempts were made to
locate the roofing company in order to secure a release from it,
it was found that it had folded up and the officers or partners
thereof could not be found. In order to remedy this condition
a statute was passed in 1937 (1937 Sess. L. 479-480, Sec. 2;
1938 Supp. to C.S.A. Chap. 40, Sec. 107 (1)) which provided where an instrument which by its terms constitutes a
promise or obligation for the payment of money and also by
its terms creates a lien on real estate as security for the payment thereof shall at the time it shall have been recorded
(whether such recording be the original recording or a recording subsequent to the original one) have borne upon its face
or upon its back an assignment, transfer or endorsement
thereof, such instrument and such assignment, transfer or endorsement or the recorded copy thereof or a certified copy of
the recorded copy thereof shall be admissible in evidence as and
constitute prima facie evidence of such transfer, assignment or
endorsement of such instrument from the person whose purported signature is affixed thereto to the person named therein,
irrespective of whether such assignment, transfer or endorse-
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ment shall have been acknowledged in the manner provided
by law for the acknowledgment of instruments relating to or
affecting title to real property or acknowledged at all. Such
section further provided it should be applicable to all of such
instruments which shall have been executed prior to the time
when such section took effect, as well as to all such instruments which are executed after the time when the section takes
effect.
(Concluded in March Issue)

ANNUAL BANQUET
The following committee has been appointed to arrange
the 1939 annual banquet. The banquet has never been held
at any stated time, and the desire this year is to fix the date to
suit the convenience of some nationally known speaker to be
secured who will stimulate the greatest interest. The task is
made difficult by our distance from the great centers of population and the fact that most figures of national prominence
would be kept from other engagements for several days by a
trip to Denver. Suggestions as to speakers will be welcomed
by the committee.
MYLES P. TALLMADGE, Chairman
John P. Akolt
S. Arthur Henry
L. Ward Bannister
Erskine R. Myer
Clarence A. Bailey
Gustave J. Ornauer
Irving Hale, Jr.
Albert L. Vogl
Horace N. Hawkins, Jr.
Floyd F. Walpole

LAWYER-MUSICIANS
All member of the bar association who have had musical training
and experience, either vocal or instrumental, please communicate with
the Editor, KE. 7771.

DUES
The Secretary's office desires to remind all members that dues
are now due and past-due; that it takes the filthy lucre to keep
the Association going, and even DICTA is obliged to look to some
extent to association dues in order to be maintained. So send in
your check now.
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THE MID-WINTER LEGAL INSTITUTE AT GREELEY
By JOHN W. O'HAGAN

HE first of a series of Legal Institutes sponsored by the
Colorado Bar Association was held at Greeley on February 4, 1939. It was planned by William R. Kelly,
chairman of the Committee on Legal Institutes, and conducted
under the immediate supervision of the Weld County Bar
Association. Eighty-five lawyers from seventeen different
towns of northern Colorado were in attendance, and all were
enthusiastic in their praise of the success of the meeting. Chairman Kelly announced that a second institute would be held at
Pueblo on March 10th.
The institute was opened by M. E. H. Smith, VicePresident of the Weld County Bar Association, who introduced Chairman William R. Kelly. The first speaker on the
program was President G. Dexter Blount, who spoke of the
origination of the idea of holding legal institutes in Colorado.
Mr. Blount explained that the intention was to hold meetings
at different times and places during the year and that practical
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legal questions of general interest to Colorado lawyers would
be introduced and discussed by men who specialized in that
particular field. In addition to the scheduled Pueblo Institute
others are planned for Alamosa and Grand Junction. He
stressed the value of the institute as enabling lawyers to obtain
first-hand knowledge of important current questions, as well
as creating a medium by which attorneys in the various localities could get together and cooperate to their mutual benefits.
Wilbur F. Denious, past president of the Colorado Bar,
was next introduced by Mr. Kelly and received a splendid tribute from the speaker and all those assembled for his untiring
efforts in the successful reorganization of the state bar.
Albert J. Gould of Denver was the leader of the afternoon session, which was devoted to the subject of "Tax Highlights for Busy Lawyers." In a brilliant manner Mr. Gould
outlined briefly the many and varied types of tax problems
which face the practicing lawyer and suggested methods leading to the solution of these problems. In regard to corporations, he stressed the necessity of proper and full corporate
minutes and outlined the reason and necessity for any given
corporate action. "The closed corporation is no longer economically sound," in the opinion of Mr. Gould, "because of
the excessive taxation which it faces." After Mr. Gould's
address, the remainder of the afternoon was given over to questions asked by the attending lawyers. Thereafter the afternoon session was adjourned at 5 o'clock and a delightful social
hour, arranged by the Weld County Bar, was enjoyed by all
those present. The dinner meeting was in charge of VicePresident Smith. Acting as toastmaster for the occasion,
Chairman Kelly introduced members of the judiciary and officers of local bar groups present. The toastmaster also acknowledged his appreciation for the successful manner in
which the various committees had handled the institute.
In a speech full of witticisms, S. Arthur Henry, of the
Denver Bar, compared the lawyers pictured in reel life with
ones in real life. He concluded that, in view of all considerations, the screen portrayal was quite benevolent.
The evening institute was under the direction of Golding
Fairfield of Denver, who delivered an able and timely address
on the "Delivery of Deeds and New Developments in Real
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Estate Law." Following the procedure inaugurated at the
opening session, Mr. Fairfield devoted the last half of the meeting to answering questions on the subject.
Before adjournment of the institute, Fred Y. Holland,
Secretary of the State Bar Association, offered a resolution of
sympathy to Delph Carpenter of Greeley, who was prevented
by illness from attending the meeting. John W. O'Hagan of
Greeley, Secretary of the institute, was requested to forward
the resolution to Mr. and Mrs. Carpenter. A resolution was
also adopted by the gathering thanking the Weld County Bar
Association for its hospitality, and expressing appreciation for
the benefits gained from attendance at the institute.
It was the consensus of all present that the institute was
a valued addition to bar association activities. Urging that
the institutes be incorporated in a permanent program of bar
activity, the lawyers attending the sessions called on the committee of legal institutes to outline future meetings.
"We are highly pleased with the results accomplished at
the Greeley meeting," said Mr. Blount after adjournment.
"In our greatest expectations, we did not hope for a crowd to
exceed sixty lawyers. The response to this meeting encourages
everyone charged with the duty of planning these institutes,
and augurs well for the future success of our plans. In addition
to the instructive benefits which are to be derived from these
meetings, lawyers become acquainted with each other. We
feel that this personal acquaintanceship improves bar association work in addition to being a matter of personal gain to the
attorneys themselves. We are all looking forward to the
Pueblo meeting on March 10th."

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION PRESIDENT
ELECTED TO BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE AMERICAN BAR
G. Dexter Blount, President of the Colorado Bar Association and state delegate to the American Bar Association, was
nominated at the mid-winter meeting of the House of Delegites of the American Bar Association held in Chicago on January 9th and 10th, for a three-year term on the Board of Gov-
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ernors to represent the 10th Judicial Circuit. Mr. Blount will
succeed Robert Stone of Topeka, whose office expires at the
July meeting of the association in San Francisco, and unless
independent nominations are made by petition, he will be
elected without opposition next July. The Board of Governors is composed of ten members, one of whom is elected from
each of the United States Judicial Circuits, and they, together
with the five principal officers of the association; namely, the
President, Secretary, Treasurer, Chairman of the House of
Delegates and Editor of the Journal, exercise administrative
control over the affairs of the association during the periods
between meetings. Charles A. Beardsley of Oakland, California, was the unopposed nominee for the presidency. Other
nominees for three-year terms on the Board of Governors
were: First Circuit, George R. Grant, State Delegate from
Massachusetts; Second Circuit, Philip J. Wickser, State Bar
Association Delegate from New York; Sixth Circuit, Carl J.
Essery, State Bar Association Delegate from Michigan.
To our genial and fast-stepping President, we extend
hearty congratulations.
JUNIOR BAR CONFERENCE
By

WILLIAM

H.

ROBINSON, JR.

The northeastern section of the Junior Bar Conference of
Colorado met in an informal session at Greeley on February 4,
1939. Approximately twenty-five young lawyers from Denver and northeastern counties were present.
Mark Harrington of Denver, president of the conference,
who presided at the meeting, gave a brief history of the growth
of the conference in Colorado, and outlined the purposes of the
group. He stressed the need for such an organization and the
good that it could accomplish in the state. As councilman for
the eighth judicial district, Barney Houtchens of Greeley welcomed the group to Greeley, and spoke briefly of the work
being done by the conference in his district.
Various committee chairmen present at the meeting reported on the program from their committees. Hugh Henry
of Denver, Secretary-Treasurer of the conference, announced

DICTA

that the state membership had exceeded by one hundred per
cent the quota set by the national body for last year, and that
early indications for this year gave promise of again exceeding
the quota.
Announcing that his committee on meetings and arrangements had planned a gathering of Junior Bar members at Pueblo immediately preceding the Legal Institute in that city,
John W. O'Hagan of Greeley stated that a series of sectional
meetings of the state conference were being planned for the
state. Present plans call for a gathering to be held on the
Western Slope this summer prior to the Colorado State Bar
Association meeting.
If the plans of the committee on sponsoring newly-admitted members of the bar can be successfully worked out with
the consent of the various groups and officials concerned, this
committee hopes to have the new brothers as guests of the conference at a dinner to be held on the day of admittance, according to the report made by Norman E. Bradley of Denver. In
addition to welcoming the group into the profession, the committee plans to sponsor the new members wherever they are
located in the state until such time as they become acquainted
with the procedural aspects of law practice.
Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr., of Denver, chairman of the
Public Relations Committee, spoke briefly on the need for the
work of this committee and of a plan to undertake a study of
the economic status of lawyers with a view toward aiding a
law school graduate to familiarize himself with the possibilities of practice in any given district in the state.
After the meeting adjourned, members of the conference
attended the Legal Institute.

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS
The Forty-first Annual Reports of The Colorado Bar
Association Proceedings, 1938, have been delivered or mailed
to the entire membership. Pursuant to provisions of the new
by-laws, which may be found in the Reports, all members of
affiliated associations automatically became members of The
Colorado Bar Association. Accordingly, over 1,100 copies of
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the Reports and the current issues of DICTA have been forwarded to members.
The Secretary is most desirous of completing and maintaining an accurate roster of all members, and will appreciate
advice as to any errors in the list found at page 312 of the
Reports.
Members are urged to preserve their Bar Reports. This
volume contains valuable information relating to the reorganization of the bar and other matter which may not be reprinted
in future editions. A complete index of State Bar Association
Reports is being compiled and will be ready for publication in
the near future. Accordingly, the value and usefulness of all
Colorado Bar Reports, and also those of other states, will be
considerably increased.

*THE NEWSPAPER'S DUTY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
The newspaper's duty is not defined by law, except as
restrictions on license are prescribed, such as libel and contempt
of court. The responsibility is an implied one and purely
moral. Asking a place in the community for profit and for
the support of its workers, the newspaper assumes the obligation of keeping the public informed in all matters of general
interest.
Newspapers like to present information to their readers
before it is widely known, the "news while it is news," to state
the matter tritely. The almost maniacal stress placed on
"scoops" by metropolitan newspapers, however, sometimes
thwarts the objectives which were sought when guarantees of
free press were written into the Constitution.
It is the duty of every citizen to aid observance of the law
and the administration of justice. The obligation rests upon
the newspaper as well as upon the citizen in other callings.
There are limitations to the information, and the time of presentation, which newspapers may rightly give their readers.
The opening statement of the deputy district attorney in
a murder trial now proceeding in district court in Sterling
doubtless came to almost all Advocate readers as new and surprising. Yet virtually all of the expected evidence was known
*Reprinted by permission of the Sterling Advocate.
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to Advocate news staff members. It was sealed in confidence,
both as to the written and spoken word, for the reason that the
development of "a case" on circumstantial evidence is ordinarily a difficult task, even though the final showing may be as
conclusive as any eye-witness evidence. To disclose the findings of investigators would be to help prepare the defense of a
person possibly guilty of a crime against all society. Innumerable crimes go unpunished; few guiltless persons lack adequate
defense.
The newspaper "story" intended for the information of
the public, if premature, can serve to warn the enemies of society, to help them cover their trail and perhaps to make their
escape from punishment. To lay the people's case down, as
cards upon the table, may be to permit the perfection of alibis
and fabrication of evidence.
The Advocate feels its obligation to be enterprising and
aggressive in the interest of its readers. It believes, however,
that its first duty is to further the ends of justice, which; after
all, is every man's sacred right and should be every man's concern. Not infrequently information must remain locked in
the mind of a conscientious newspaper worker for several years
before it can properly be disclosed.
The Advocate believes in the trial of criminal causes by
the courts, and not in columns of the newspapers-in deliberate justice, and not in public passion.
DUES AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE COLORADO BAR

ASSOCIATION
A Statement from the Treasurer, EDWARD C. KING
Since the reorganization of The Colorado Bar Association at the September meeting a number of questions have
arisen with respect to dues and membership.
I believe that the following are correct statements of the
rules which should be followed under the circumstances mentioned in each, and that they are in accordance with the understanding reached by the Board of Governors at its first meeting
in Colorado Springs.
1. A lawyer may not be or become a member of an affiliated association without being or becoming a member of the state association.
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and liable to dues for both.
2. No lawyer who resides in a community in which there is an
affiliated association may be or become a member of the state association,
except as a result of his membership in the affiliated association, provided,
however, that anyone who was a member of the state association prior to
the September meeting at Colorado Springs and who has paid his state
association dues to June 30, 1939, will continue to be a member until
such later date, regardless of his place of residence or his connection with
an affiliated association.
3. If any member of an affiliated association shall have paid, or
shall hereafter pay, dues to the state association at the old rate ($6 per
year) for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, or for any prior fiscal
year, he shall not be entitled to a refund, but the affiliated association of
which he is a member shall be entitled to a credit of $3 for any such dues
paid for the year ending June 30, 1939.
4. Each affiliated association should certify to the Secretary of
the state association a complete list of its members, and should report any
additional members within thirty days after their election.
5. The Treasurer of the state association should, as soon as practicable after the receipt of this list by the Secretary, bill the affiliated association for the sum of $3 for each member liable to the payment of dues,
using as a basis for such billing the list certified to the state association,
and the affiliated association shall be responsible for the dues of its members and shall remit the same to the Treasurer of the state association.
6. If a lawyer is a member of two affiliated associations, he should
make an election as to which of the two shall pay his dues to the state
association, and should notify the Treasurer of the state association of
his election.
7. If a lawyer resides in a community in which there is no affiliated association and is an active member of the state association, his dues
shall be $6 for each fiscal year.

HEARD AROUND THE BAR
Friendliness and hospitality take first rank with members of the Weld County Bar Association. The old-time spirit
of camaraderie is not lost in this group.
After dinner speaker par excellence, Art Henry, entertained in his usual brilliant and delightful fashion. His text
was built around the lawyer as characterized by the movies:
or to paraphrase his subject: "A Three-reeler in One Unwinding."
The meeting was made more delightful and cheerful to
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ye olde fogies by the attendance of the only woman lawyer in
the county, Mrs. Shirley Payne of Windsor. She appeared
perfectly at ease and delighted amid her surroundings. Her
ability as a lawyer has commanded the respect of old-time
practitioners in that community.
Raphael Moses, Esq., now with his dad at Alamosa,
traveled perhaps the longest distance to attend the institute.
A happy father and son combination, palling together
at the meeting, were Wilbur F. Denious and son, Dayton.
Papa Denious was radiating with pleasure and satisfaction at
the success of this first institute. Judge H. H. Hartman and
son, John, were also present.
Most happy and enthusiastic of all those in attendance
were William R. Kelly, chairman of the Committee on Institutes, and G. Dexter Blount, President of the Colorado Bar,
who planned and arranged the meeting. It was truly a great
success and others will follow.
Our heartfelt thanks for this very delightful occasion
goes to the Weld County Bar Association, its officers and committees who made it possible.
Lawyers are urged to send to the Secretary of the Junior
Bar Conference the names of all attorneys in their locality who
are under the age of thirty-six years, as Mr. Henry is compiling
a list of young lawyers practicing within the state. Mr.
Henry's address is Colorado National Bank, Denver, Colo.
David J. Miller, formerly of Denver, has moved his office
to Greeley. Mr. Miller was at one time associate counsel of
the Federal Land Bank at Wichita. After resigning from this
position, he came to Denver as general counsel of the Denver
Joint Stock Land Bank, and also acted as legislative counsel
for the Farm Credit Administration of Wichita.
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To the Weld County Bar Association, Chas. C. Townsend, President, goes the distinction of being the first of the
local associations to remit its dues in full, at the same time
reporting a one hundred per cent membership. Thanks, gentlemen, for your splendid cooperation.
The following numbers of Colorado Supreme Court Reports are out of print, and at times it is impossible to obtain
them in the second-hand markets: volumes 22, 26, 29, 51, 53,
63, 64, 69, 72, 77, 78, 80, 81 and 82. A word to the wise!
Court of Appeals Reports, volumes 7-14, inclusive, are
out of print and scarce.
A new book by Dean Pound, "The Formative Era of
American Law," is offered by the publishers at $2, delivered.
The purpose of this statement is to call attention to the inordinate difference in prices of law books, taking into consideration also the authority and enduring values of some law books
as compared to others usually offered at many times this price.
The most popular reference book in the Supreme Court
Library is "Tax Systems of the World." It contains a complete summary of all the tax laws.
GUEST OF SENATOR E. 0. WOLCOTT
Joseph H. Choate, on one of his visits to Washington,
was a guest of Senator Wolcott of Colorado, as was also the
late Thos. B. Reed, of the House of Representatives. The
conversation turned upon what some would consider vices,
and others, frailties of mankind, and Mr. Choate remarked,
"I have never smoked a cigar, never played a game of poker,
and never attended a horse race in my life." Senator Wolcott
looked pathetically at Speaker Reed and said, "I wish I could
say that." Mr. Reed's characteristic and witty response was:
"You can, Choate did." Strong's Life, 89.

Supreme Court Decisions
EQUITY-SUIT TO SET ASIDE CONVEYANCE-FRAUD--AGENCYCORPORATIONS-Gutheil vs. Polichio-No.14268-Decided Jan-

uary 16, 1939-DistrictCourt of Arapahoe County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Suit brought to set aside conveyance of and trust deed on
real estate owned in name of corporation on ground that it was transferred for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding creditors.
HELD: 1. Where it appears that judgment debtor's association
with corporation holding title to property was so close and exclusive
that it strips the company of its corporate cloak and leaves the debtor
standing in its place, holding in one hand the "accredited agency" of his
wife to do whatever he deemed best for her and himself, and-in the other
hand the minute book of the corporation with the opportunity of making whatever entries were necessary to meet a given situation, the courts
"will disregard the fiction of the corporate entity apart from the members
of the corporation when it is attempted to be used as a means of accomplishing a fraud or an illegal act.' "
2. Once the corporate entity is dissipated, "the transaction becomes one of dealing between husband and wife, or even one of the husband, with the 'accredited agency' of his wife, dealing with himself,
which, when it obstructs the collection of claims of creditors is presumptively fraudulent."
3. Assuming there was full consideration for the conveyances,
there is no doubt they were made with the intent to fraudulently hinder
and delay creditor from collecting his judgment.
4. Even though wife of judgment creditor "did not participate
in the intent, she is estopped from urging such defense because of the
investiture of her husband with the accredited agency."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur.

IN DEPARTMENT.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-APPEAL-CERTIORARI-West us.

Judd, et al.-No. 14473-Decided January 16, 1939--County
Court of Denver-Hon. Osmer E. Smith, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff brought F. E. D. action in Justice Court for nonpayment of rent after serving statutory three day notice. Defendant
filed verified answer admitting that some rental was due but pleaded
there was included in the lease, an agreement to transfer the property to
defendant when "certain sums of money had been paid," and asked that
matter be transferred to District Court. Before trial, defendant tendered
an amended answer in which he amplified the issue, but its filing was denied. In a trial to Justice of the Peace, judgment was given against
defendant for $75 rent and possession of premises and costs.
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DICTA

The contract to purchase attached to the lease provided that defendant could purchase property after paying $350, but defendant did not
show or allege he paid such sum. The defendant sought review in the
County Court by civil code certiorari, but writ was subsequently
quashed.
HELD: 1. The action was grounded on 1935 C.S.A. Chapter
70, Section 4, opening paragraph and subdivision fourth, which permits
only of appeal by observing special requirements as to bond and deposit
of adjudged unpaid rental. Resort was not had to statutory certiorari
(1935 C.S.A., Chap. 96, Secs. 132-139), permissible in unusual situations as a " 'substitute for an appeal.' "
2. The contention of the defendant "that regardless of the quality
of the issue as tendered by the complaint before the justice, his answer
and preferred amended answer operated to so change the issue as to require the justice to certify the case to the district court," is based upon
1935 C.S.A., Chap. 70, Sec. 9. This section is without application
since it has only to do with actions brought under the sixth to ninth
subdivisions of Section 4 of Chapter 70.
3.
" 'It may be that defendants had the right to plead that they
were in possession, not as tenants, but as vendees, but that would not
permit the question of title to be tried, such pleading would only be one
denying the tenancy alleged by plaintiff. * * *' "

Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard.
Mr. Justice Bock concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

Mr. Justice Bouck and

CRIMINAL LAW-BURGLARY AND LARCENY-ACCOMPLICE-DECOY
-INSTRUCTION-Wilson
vs. People-No. 14385-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court of Logan County-Hon. H. E.
Munson, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. One who participates in a felony as a decoy or feigned
accomplice, in order to entrap the other, is not crimirially liable, and he
need not take an officer of the law into his confidence to avoid an imputation of criminal intent.
2. An instruction which makes any assistance in the perpetration
of an offense criminal, whether felonious or not, should not be given.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice
Burke not participating. EN BANC.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION---Jones vs. Pueblo Savings and Trust Co., et

al.-No. 14484-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court of
Pueblo County-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Will construed and found to mean that daughter of
testator had vested interest in one-half of estate at death of father, and
therefore upon her death, her interest in estate goes to her heirs and
administrator of her estate.

DICTA
2. The intention of the testator controls, and his intention must,
if possible, be ascertained from the will itself.
3. Where provision in will devises and bequeaths to the daughter
directly and not to a trustee, and the bank is designated as "guardian"
and trustee of her estate for the limitations of time mentioned, the use
of the term "guardian" implies a vested interest in the daughter and a
stewardship by the trust company until she reaches the age specified,
inconsistent with intent to create a purely contingent estate.
4. The law favors the vesting of estates.
5. " 'An estate will vest at the death of the testator unless a later
time for vesting is clearly expressed by the words of the will or by necessary implication therefrom.' "
6. An interpretation which avoids partial intestacy is preferred.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
NEGLIGENCE-MOTOR
WAY-

EVIDENCE

VEHICLES---STATE
-INSURANCE

HIGHWAYS-RIGHT

COMPANIES

OF

-HYPOTHETICAL

QUESTIONS-Johns, et al. vs. Shinal--No. 14205-DecidedJanuary 9, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Evidence in automobile accident case examined and
found to contain competent testimony from which a jury might find one
of the drivers to have taken the right of way.
2. In accident occurring outside of the city limits of Denver, the
pertinent right of way statutes provide that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle already
in the intersection; and that when both cars enter the intersection at the
same time, the one on the left shall yield to the one on the right.
3.
Questions touching upon their connection with or interest in
insurance companies may be asked of every prospective juror.
4. The mere statement of a witness, in answer to a proper question, which mentions "insurance company," is not sufficient ground for
a mistrial. On motion, it should be stricken and the jury instructed to
disregard it.
5.
The decision to order a mistrial in such case rests within the
discretion of the trial court.
6. Exclusion of photographs of car taken after the wheel damaged
by the collision bad been replaced by another did not constitute reversible
error.
7. It was not error for the trial court to sustain objections to
hypothetical questions propounded to a physician where the questions
did not state all the facts which one testifying solely as an expert should
assume.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. EN BANC.

DICTA
FRAUD AND DECEIT-PLEADING--PARTIES-Langworthy vs. Republic Mutual Insurance Corporation, et a.-No.
14209-Decided
January 9, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. "If one in his complaint sets forth material false representations it might be proper, on motion, to require him to state how
and in what manner the representations were false, but unless application is made in apt time that the complaint be made specific in such particulars defendants are not entitled to the information and cannot raise
the issue by demurrer."
2.
Where plaintiff seeks to have title to certain land returned to
her and a note cancelled on the basis of alleged fraud and deceit, the court
must have jurisdiction of all the parties affected and the land. There
was no misjoinder of parties.
3.
The receiver for the corporation defendant stands in the shoes
of the corporation which was a party to the alleged fraud, and is therefore a proper party.
4.
The one who holds the equity in the land and the one who
holds the note and mortgage are also proper parties.
5.
The plaintiff may follow the fruits of the fraud unless they
come into the hands of one who has taken them for value without notice
of the fraud.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bakke, Mr. Justice
Knous, and Mr. Justice Holland dissenting. EN BANC.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-IndustrialCommission, et al. vs. International Mutual Liability Insurance Company, et al.-No. 14404
-Decided
January 9, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon.
Robert W. Steele, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. In determining which insurance carrier was to pay for
death of employee occurring in Adams County, contract of insurance
examined, and although stating, "Locations of all factories, * * * or
other work-places of the assured to which this.Policy shall apply, * * *
are as follows: 'Within City Limits of Florence, Colorado, on East
Main Street,' " held to cover accident.
2.
The Manual of Rules of Industrial Commission, known to
insurance company, provide that the term "risk" shall mean and include
the entire operations in Colorado; and that "under no circumstances
shall a compensation insurance policy be written covering any part of a
given risk, leaving another part of the risk uninsured. * * *"
3. With all the evidence before it, the Industrial Commission,
as a fact-finding body, had the right to place the liability on the insurance
company.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.

DICTA
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AGENCY-REAL ESTATE--SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-INTERVENORS
-Ramey vs. Gent. Craig Lumber Company, et al., IntervenorsNo. 14468-Decided January 9, 1939-DistrictCourt of Moffat
County-Hon. John R. Clark, Judge-Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
1. Where one attempts to convey property of another
HELD:
to a third person, but does not have proper authority, owner may refuse
to ratify and, in turn, convey to his own grantee.
2.
Where a contract for the sale of three parcels of property is
entered into and it appears that the conveyance of parcels 1 and 2 depend
upon conveyance of parcel 3, and it develops that the latter may not be
conveyed, it is error for the court to decree specific performance of the
contract as to the first two parcels.
3.
The intervention of the judgment creditors of one of the parties to the contract falls with the main case.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating. EN BANC.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TAXATION - MISJOINDER-SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE-Wellshire Land Company vs. City and County
of Denver-No. 14475-Decided January 3, 1939-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: City of Denver brought suit for specific performance to
enforce warranty of defendant company that land conveyed by latter
to city was "free and clear from all former * * * liens, taxes, assessments and encumbrances."
On the date of the deed the land conveyed,
situate in Arapahoe County, was subject to 1936 tax lien in the sum of
$1,261.24. After deed was made company was dissolved and $1,200
placed in hands of its president in trust to pay this tax. On sale for tax,
Arapahoe
County took certificate.
County
commissioners of Arapahoe County were named
as defendants, and part of prayer asked exoneration from taxes while lands were
seized and possessed by city.
Demurrer lodged against complaint for want of facts and misjoinder
of parties overruled by lower court and company elected to stand.
HELD: Against.contention that Section 4, Article X of the state
Constitution, exempting property of municipal corporations from taxation, there are two answers: (1) the lien of record, however, invalid, is
cloud on title, removal thereof compellable; and (2) tax was, and is,
due Arapahoe County, and warranty being for its benefit, is based on
sufficient consideration.
Failure to serve commissioners and abandonment of that phase of

case, misjoinder cannot be asserted.
Point made that judgment for $1,200 in suit for specific performance where sum is impounded in registry of court, is technically right,
but trivial and one of form only, and since company benefited to extent
of $61.24, it cannot complain.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

DICTA
PLEADINGS-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS -EXHIBIT
ATTACHED TO PLEADINGS-FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER-

Bailey, etc. vs. Wilkinson, et al.-No. 14466-Decided January9,
1939--County Court of Denver-Hon. Osmer E. Smith, Judge
-Reversed.
HELD: 1. Pleadings in forcible entry and detainer suit examined
and found to be insufficient upon which to base judgment on pleadings.
2. Where plaintiff relies upon sheriff's deed recorded in 1938 and
defendant relies upon deed recorded in 1936, and nothing appears to
show that the lien of the sheriff's deed of 1938 related back to a date
prior to that of defendant's recording, the court could not decide for
plaintiff.
3. Where a copy of the notice and demand served upon defendant
is attached to complaint, only the allegations concerning it in the complaint are sworn to by the plaintiff in the verification of the complaint.
The verification of the pleading does not cover the truth or falsity of the
statements contained in the exhibit.
4. The pleadings should be amended. If the "defendant can
show that he is a tenant of third persons, and if plaintiffs fail to show
that these third persons held the properties subject to a valid lien which
has legally ripened into a valid sheriff's deed, then judgment would of
course be in favor of the defendant. The sheriff's deed has only prima
facie effect."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
TORTS

-

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

-

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

-

Frances Wilson vs. Celia Hill-No. 14046-Decided January 3,
1939-District Court of El Paso County-Hon. John Meikle,
Judge-Judgmentreversed and remanded.
FACTS: The defendant was the driver of a car and plaintiff was
riding therein as her guest. Defendant's arm had previously been operated upon, as a result of which she was unable to properly drive the automobile. At a point between Canon City and Colorado Springs, the defendant, over strong protests from plaintiff, changed places with another
guest who was driving and insisted on driving herself. The question
involved is whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in
remaining in the car when she knew of defendant's incapacity.
HELD: It was error not to instruct the jury that the plaintiff's
remaining in the car might constitute contributory negligence. Contributory negligence can consist of an unreasonable exposure to risk. However, the passenger's duty to leave the automobile must be judged in the
light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, such as the time of
the day or night, the place and surroundings, the availability of other
means of transportation and other pertinent considerations.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.

EN BANC.

DICTA
SEZ THE JEDGE:
"Maybe Leo Thompson was justified in asking a divorce from
Dorothy Meaney Thompson and there might have been plenty of
grounds in the case of Kruel vs. Kruel, but who busted the harp in
Angel vs. Angel?" (Denver divorce records.)
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